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Abstract:   
In this article, we estimate age based wage and productivity differentials using linked 
employer-employee Canadian data from the Workplace and Employee Survey 1999-
2003. Data on the firm side is used to estimate production functions taking into 
account the age profile of the firm’s work-force. Data on the workers’ side is used to 
estimate wage equations that also depend on age. Results show concave age-wage 
and age-productivity profiles. Wage-productivity comparisons show that the 
productivity of workers aged 55 and more with at least an undergraduate degree is 
lower than their wages. For other groups, we find that wages do not deviate 
significantly from productivity estimates. 
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21 Introduction
Wage differentials based on different levels of schooling or experience are well
documented in the labor economics literature. These are generally interpreted
as productivity differentials based on an investment model of human capital.
Models generally predict that wages increase in the early stages of a career until
they reach a plateau, afterwhich, they start do diminish due to human capital
depreciation (Mincer (1974)).
There are many reasons, however, to doubt that wage differentials always
correspond to differences in productivity. Alternative explanations include incen-
tive-compatible wages (Lazear (1979)), forced saving mechanisms (Frank and
Hutchens (1993) and Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991)), efficiency wages (Ak-
erlof and Yellen (1986)), minimization of turnover related costs (Salop and Salop
(1976)), specific training (Hutchens (1989)) or wage discrimination.1
Obtaining empirical evidence is thus important in order to know which the-
oretical model best describes the labor market. Moreover, some theoretical
models predict that productivity-wage differentials will vary by age. For ex-
ample, the employer might be using a deferred compensation package (through
which workers are paid below productivity at the beginning of their career and
above their productivity later) in order to elicit optimal worker effort. If such
a model is supported by the data, this would have important consequences for
the ability of a country facing an aging population to maintain competitiveness.
In one of the first detailed empirical studies on this topic, Medoff and Abra-
ham (1980) find evidence that the wages of older workers might be higher than
their productivity. Corroborating evidence has been found in numerous coun-
tries and for different professions using a variety of methodologies, including
1Discrepancies between wages and productivity could also arise due to labor market im-
perfections (for example due to minimum wages laws and trade unions, or oligopsonistic
wage-setting (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)), etc.).
3Oster and Hamermesh (1998) for economists, Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) for
workers in the U.S. manufacturing industries, Fair (1994) for American ath-
letes, Cre´pon, Deniau, and Pe´rez-Duarte (2003) for France2 and Haegeland and
Klette (1999) for Norway. However, many other studies find the opposite result,
for example Mitchell (1990), Smith (1991), Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) and
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999).
In this article, we estimate age-specific wage and productivity differentials
using Canadian data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 1999-
2003. The survey is designed to be representative of all firms operating in
Canada and contains detailed information on each firm’s production process,
organizational practices (and changes in such practices), and human resources
policies. Since the survey is linked, there is no need to assign workers to firms us-
ing statistical matching methods like Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999).
Also, because the survey is linked, we are able to obtain an external value for a
worker’s productivity, independent of his or her wage.
We use a methodology that is similar to Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske
(1999) and Aubert and Cre´pon (2003). More specifically, we use data at the
workplace level to estimate production functions taking into account the age
composition of the firm’s workforce and use data at the employee level to esti-
mate wage equations distinguishing workers based on their age.
However, we improve on their methodologies along several lines. First, we
estimate wage equations taking into account both individual and firm unob-
served heterogeneity using a mixed model of wage determination (as suggested
by Abowd and Kramarz (1999b)). Second, we also control for unobserved time-
varying productivity shocks in the production function using a method suggested
by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Third, we look at the sensitivity of the wage
2Aubert and Cre´pon (2003) show that those results are sensitive to the way unobserved pro-
ductivity shocks are taken into account in the estimation method. Using a different method-
ology, they cannot reject the hypothesis that wages equal productivity.
4productivity-differentials to the measurement of the labor input by the number
of employees or hours of work. Finally, we test whether productivity differentials
are sensitive to the inclusion of workplace practices and organisational changes
in the production function.
We find that wage profiles are not very sensitive to the inclusion of unob-
served heterogeneity at the workplace and worker levels. We do find however
productivity profiles to be steeper once unobserved productivity shocks are con-
trolled for. Finally, while we find concave profiles for both wage and produc-
tivity, our results also show that the productivity of workers aged 55 and more
with at least an undergraduate degree is lower than their wages.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. We first describe our method-
ology in section 2 and present the data and some descriptive statistics in the
following section. We describe the results in section 4 and conclude briefly in
section 5. All tables are in the appendix.
2 Methodology
Our methodology improves on previous work in two main ways (1) we take
into account firm unobserved heterogeneity (in addition to worker unobserved
heterogeneity) in the estimation of the wage equation and (2) we also take
into account unobserved time-varying productivity shocks using an estimation
method suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in the estimation of the
production function. We describe both models in the following subsections.
52.1 Production function
In order to estimate age-productivity profiles, first consider a Cobb-Douglas
production function
logQjt = α logLAjt + β logKjt + γFjt + ujt (1)
where Q is the value added by firm j at time t, LA is an aggregate function
of different types of workers, K is the capital stock and u the error term. In
what follows, types of workers refer to workers of different age, gender and
education3. F is a matrix of workplace characteristics that are chosen in order
to make the specification in (1) as comparable as possible to the specification for
the wage equation. F therefore includes industry (13), region (6) and year (4)
dummies but also some other characteristics of the workforce like the proportion
of workers in each of six occupation categories and three ethnic origins, the
proportion of employees that are married, the proportion of immigrants and the
proportion of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. For each
workplace, we observe a representative sample of workers and we use this sample
to construct worker proportions mentioned above. We also take advantage of
the fact that the WES contains detailed data about workplace practices (6) and
organisational changes (14) by including these as controls in the production
function.
Let Ljtk be the number of workers of type k in firm j at time t, and φk
be their productivity. If we assume that workers of each type are perfectly
3It would be interesting to also distinguish workers based on other dimensions, for example
occupation. However, given the relatively small number of workers that was sampled from
each workplace, this would make our constructed proportions too imprecise. We therefore
stick to age, gender and education in the analysis that follows.
6substitutable, we can write
LAjt =
K∑
k=0
λkLjtk = λj0Ljt +
K∑
k=1
(λjk − λj0)Ljtk (2)
where Ljt is the total number of workers in the firm λ0 the productivity of the
reference category of workers. If we assume that a worker has the same marginal
product accross firm4, we can rewrite equation (2) as
logLAjt = log λ0 + logLjt + log
(
1 +
K∑
k=1
(
λk
λ0
− 1
)
Pjkt
)
(3)
where Pjkt is the ratio of the number of workers of type k over the total number
of employees. We then write the production function as
logQjt = α log λ0 + α logLjt +
+α log
(
1 +
K∑
k=1
(
λk
λ0
− 1
)
Pjkt
)
+ β logKjt + γFjt + ujt (4)
As Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), we distinguish three age groups:
less then 35, between 35 and 55, and over 55. As to education, we distinguish
workers based on whether they have at least an undergraduate degree or not.
Therefore, workers are thus separated in 7 categories (men and women (M and
W); young, middle age or old (Y, P and O); with or without a degree (D, N)).
If we take young male workers without a degree as our reference category, we
can write:
4Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) find that their productivity differentials esti-
mates are robust to that assumption.
7logLAjt = log λ0 + logLjt +
+ log

1 + γMYD
LMYDjt
Ljt
+ γMPN
LMPNjt
Ljt
+ γMPD
LMPDjt
Ljt
γMON
LMONjt
Ljt
+ γMOD
LMODjt
Ljt
+
γWYN
LWYNjt
Ljt
+ γWYD
LWYDjt
Ljt
+
γWPN
LWPNjt
Ljt
+ γWPD
LWPDjt
Ljt
+
γWON
LWONjt
Ljt
+ γWOD
LWODjt
Ljt
+

(5)
where γ equal (λ/λ0 − 1). Since log(1 + x) ' x, we can approximate this by
logLAjt = log λ0 + logLjt + γMYD
LMYDjt
Ljt
+
γMPN
LMPNjt
Ljt
+ γMPD
LMPDjt
Ljt
+
γMON
LMONjt
Ljt
+ γMOD
LMODjt
Ljt
+
γWYN
LWYNjt
Ljt
+ γWYD
LWYDjt
Ljt
+
γWPN
LWPNjt
Ljt
+ γWPD
LWPDjt
Ljt
+
γWON
LWONjt
Ljt
+ γWOD
LWODjt
Ljt
(6)
We call this specification the “complete” model. If we impose the following
restrictions: γMYD = γD, γMPN = γP , γMPD = γP ·γD, γMON = γO, γMOD =
γO ·γD, γWYD = γW , γWYD = γW ·γD, γWPN = γW ·γP , γWPD = γW ·γP ·γD,
γWON = γW · γO, γWOD = γW · γO · γD, we can write a more parsimonious
specification as
logLAjt = log λ0 + logLjt + γW
LWjt
Ljt
+ γP
LPjt
Ljt
+ γO
LOjt
Ljt
+ γD
LDjt
Ljt
(7)
We call this last specification the “restricted” model. Substituting (2) in (4)
8gives us the restricted production function:
logQjt ' β0 + α logLjt + β logKjt + αγW
LWjt
Ljt
+ αγP
LPjt
Ljt
+
αγO
LOjt
Ljt
+ αγD
LDjt
Ljt
+ γFjt + ujt (8)
and the complete model follows from the substitution of (6) in (4) :
logQjt ' β0 + α logLjt + β logKjt + αγMYD
LMYDjt
Ljt
+
αγMPN
LMPNjt
Ljt
+ αγMPD
LMPDjt
Ljt
+
αγMON
LMONjt
Ljt
+ αγMOD
LMODjt
Ljt
+
αγWYN
LWYNjt
Ljt
+ αγWYD
LWYDjt
Ljt
+
αγWPN
LWPNjt
Ljt
+ αγWPD
LWPDjt
Ljt
+
αγWON
LWONjt
Ljt
+ αγWOD
LWODjt
Ljt
+ γFjt + ujt (9)
where β0 is a constant term that incorporates α log λ0 and δ is a vector of
parameters.
Note that coefficient estimates of equations (8) and (9) will be biased if input
choices in the production function are correlated to unobserved productivity
shocks (Griliches and Mairesse (1998)). Profit maximizing firms will respond
to a positive shock by increasing production, which requires more input. In
a similar manner, negative productivity shocks will lead firms to lower their
production level. Among the studies using production function to estimate
productivity differentials, only Aubert and Cre´pon (2003) take this problem
into account.5
Many methods have been proposed to overcome this problem. A popular
5However, Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) do use instrumental variables for ma-
terials when estimating a production function on gross output.
9estimation strategy relies on system generalized method of moments methods as
first proposed by Blundell and Bond (1999). This is the method used by Aubert
and Cre´pon (2003) who find that taking into account unobserved productivity
shocks completely reverse the conclusion of Cre´pon, Deniau, and Pe´rez-Duarte
(2003). However, Gorodnichenko (2006) shows that the Blundell and Bond esti-
mator is in general weakly identified. A comparison of the coefficient estimates
between Aubert and Cre´pon (2003) and Cre´pon, Deniau, and Pe´rez-Duarte
(2003) shows, as expected, that the productivity differentials are less precisely
estimated in the former case.
To correct for endogenous input choices, we thus prefer to use a two-stages
estimation method suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The idea of their
estimator is to invert the demand function for capital and materials to infer
a value for the unobserved productivity shock. The estimated productivity
shock is then used as a regressor in the production function. See Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) for complete details. We note that the method assumes
that the inversion function is non stochastic. If this assumption is violated,
estimates will be biased (as argued by Bond and Soderborm (2005), Ackerberg,
Caves, and Frazer (2003) and Basu (1999)6). However, Gorodnichenko (2006)
provides Monte-Carlo evidence showing that the resulting bias is likely to be
smaller than the bias from OLS methods, at least in the case of returns to scale
estimation. With this caveat in mind, we present two sets of results using OLS
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methods.
2.2 Wage equations
Turning to the estimation of the relationship between age and wages, it is pos-
sible to use two approaches: wage regressions at the worker level or payroll
6Alternative estimation strategies proposed by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2003) and
Olley and Pakes (1996) rely on similar assumptions and will share this bias.
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regressions. Cre´pon, Deniau, and Pe´rez-Duarte (2003) and Hellerstein, Neu-
mark, and Troske (1999) estimate payroll equations for two reasons (1) they
enable joint estimation of payroll and production function equations, and there-
fore yield a direct test of the hypothesis that wages equal productivity for each
age group; and (2) they argue that the simultaneous model minimizes the impact
of unobserved factors on productivity and wages.
However, an aggregate approach to estimate age-based wage-differentials
cannot take into account unobserved heterogeneity at the worker level. This
could be important if labor attachment varies by age according to unobserved
productivity differences between workers. Therefore, in the analysis that follows,
we will favor the disaggregated approach.7
In order to take into account both firm and workplace heterogeneity in our
model of wage determination, we use a two-factor analysis of covariance with
repeated observations along the lines of Abowd and Kramarz (1999b):
yit = µ+ xitβ + θi + ψj(i,t) + it (10)
with
θi = αi + uiη (11)
where yit is the (log) wage rate observed for individual i = 1, ..., N , at time
t = 1, ..., Ti. Person effects are denoted by i, firm effects by j (as a function
of i and t), and time effects by t. µ is a constant, xit is a matrix containing
demographic information for employee i at time t8 as well as information con-
cerning the workplace j to which the worker i is linked. Although β and η can
be fixed or random, we assume they are fixed in our estimations. All other
7Thus, our results obtained from wage equations are not directly comparable to Hellerstein,
Neumark, and Troske (1999).
8In particular, we include information about age, gender and education in a consistent
manner with equations (8) and (9) in order to evaluate wage-productivity differentials.
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effects are random. Personal heterogeneity (θi) is a measure of unobserved (αi)
and observed (uiη) human capital and follows the worker from firm to firm.
Employer heterogeneity
(
ψj
)
is a measure of firm-specific compensation policies
and is paid to all workers of the same firm9. it is the statistical residual.
In full matrix notation, we have
y = Xβ + Uη +Dα + Fψ +  (12)
where: y is the N∗ ×1 vector of earnings outcomes; X is the N∗ × q matrix of
observable time-varying characteristics including the intercept; β is a q × 1 pa-
rameter vector; U is the N∗ × p matrix of time invariant person characteristics;
η is a p × 1 parameter vector; D is the N∗ × N design matrix of the unobserved
component for the person effect; α is the N ×1 vector of person effects; F is
the N∗ × J design matrix of the firm effects; ψ is the J ×1 vector of pure firm
effects; and  is the N∗ ×1 vector of residuals.
Estimation of (12) on large-scale data sets has been achieved by Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) while treating firm and person effects as fixed.
Here we focus on a mixed-model specification for wage determination because
the sampling frame does not follow workers moving from firm to firm. When
this is the case, parametric assumptions embedded in the mixed model are nec-
essary to distinguish firm and individual unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore,
identification of individual and firm random effects comes from the longitudinal
and linked aspects of the data as well as from distributional assumptions. For
individual effects, identification comes from the repeated observations on each
individual over time. Identification of firm effects comes from repeated obser-
vations on workers from the same firm. Our choice for a mixed specification
is done without loss of generality since it can be shown that the least squares
9Firm unobserved heterogeneity in productivity is a common factor in many models of
wage dispersion, see Mortensen (2003).
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estimates of the fixed effects are a special case of the mixed model estimates
(see Abowd and Kramarz (1999b)).
We thus assume α and ψ to be distributed normally :

α
ψ

 ˜ N


0
0
0
 ,

σ2αIN 0 0
0 σ2ψIJ 0
0 0 Λ

 (13)
where
Λ =

Σ1 0 ... 0
... ... ...
0 ... Σi ... 0
... ... ...
0 ... 0 ΣN

and
Σi = V (i)
with
Ω =
 σ2αIN 0
0 σ2ψIJ
 . (14)
is the matrix of variance components.
Parameters estimates are obtained in two steps. We first use Restricted
Maximum Likelihood (REML) methods to get parameter estimates for the vari-
ance components in (13). We then solve the mixed equations to get estimates
for the other parameters in the full model (12). These steps are discussed in
details in Abowd and Kramarz (1999b). However, two important points should
be made about the estimates for
(
βˆ, ηˆ, αˆ, ψˆ
)
. First, mixed model solutions(
βˆ, ηˆ, αˆ, ψˆ
)
converge to the least squares solutions as |Ω| → ∞ (if Λ = σ2IN∗).
In this sense, the least squares solutions are a special case of the mixed model
13
solutions. Second, unlike the usual random effects specification considered in
the econometric literature, (12) and (13) do not assume that the random effects
are orthogonal to the design (X and U) of the fixed effects (β and η), that is
we do not assume X ′D = X ′F = U ′D = U ′F = 0. If this were the case, we
could solve for βˆ and ηˆ independently of αˆ and ψˆ.
3 Data
We use data from the WES conducted by Statistics Canada annually from
the year 1999 to 200310. The survey is both longitudinal and linked in that
it documents the characteristics of workers and workplaces over time11. The
target population for the “workplace” component of the survey is defined as the
collection of all Canadian establishments who paid employees in March of the
year of the survey. The sample comes from the “Business registry” of Statistics
Canada, which contains information on every business operating in Canada.
The survey, however, does not cover the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and
Nunavut. Firms operating in fisheries, agriculture and cattle farming are also
excluded.
For the “employee” component, the target population is the collection of all
employees working, or on paid leave, in the workplace target population. Em-
ployees are sampled from an employees list provided by the selected workplaces.
For every workplace, a maximum number of 24 employees is selected and for
establishments with less than 4 employees, all employees are sampled. In the
case of total non-response, respondents are withdrawn entirely from the survey
and sampling weights are recalculated in order to preserve representativeness of
the sample. The WES selects new employees and workplaces in odd years (at
10This is a restricted-access data set available in Statistics Canada Research Data Centers
(RDC).
11Abowd and Kramarz (1999a) classify WES as a survey in which both the sample of work-
places and the sample of workers are cross-sectionally representative of the target population.
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every third year for employees and at every fifth year for workplaces). Hence,
the survey can only be representative of the whole target population during
these re-sampling years.
One limitation of the WES is that the survey does not incorporate a measure
of the firm’s capital stock. However, Turcotte and Rennison (2003) also use the
WES to estimate production function and solve this problem by using industry
average capital stock as a proxy for the individual firm’s capital stock. We also
use this approach in this paper. Industry average capital stocks come from Table
310002 of CANSIM II at Statistics Canada. These capital stocks correspond
to net geometric end of year stock for all capital accounts. We then divide
these industry averages by the number of firms in each industry to obtain an
individual firm’s capital stock. We discuss the likely impact of this imputation
method below. Table 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for all variables used
in our analysis. Note that it is not possible for confidentiality reasons to show
minima and maxima.
4 Results
Table 3 summarizes wage-productivity differentials for the restricted model. The
impact of age on wage is shown in the first column while the second and third
column show the impact of age on productivity, distinguishing between whether
we measure the labor input by the proportion of workers in each age group or
the proportion of hours worked by workers in each age group. The first panel
shows OLS results while the second panel shows coefficient estimates obtained
from the (preferred) mixed model for the wage equation and Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003)’s method for the production function.
Our preferred estimates show that both wage and productivity profiles are
concave: wage and productivity are both at their highest for the 35-55 age
15
group and diminish afterward. However, the degree of concavity is sensitive to
the way we estimate the model: productivity profiles are steeper if we measure
the labor input by the number of employees in each group and wage profiles are
also steeper when using OLS. This is probably explained by the fact that more
productive workers (due to unobserved reasons) are more likely to stay in the
labor force after age 55, but are working fewer hours. It is worth noting that
productivity-age profiles do not seem very sensitive to the estimation method
we use12.
Comparing wage and productivity differentials, we cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that wages are equal to productivity. While workers aged between 35 and
55 earn 13% more on average than younger workers, we estimate their produc-
tivity to be 15% higher. Similarly, older workers earn on average 12% more
but are 13% more productive. Note that we observe a wage-productivity gap
when measuring the labor input by the number of workers in each age group.
This underlines the importance of correctly measuring labor in the production
function.
To assess the robustness of those results, we now turn to coefficient estimates
from the complete model where we interact age with gender and education.
These results are presented separately for men without (Table 4) or with a
degree (Table 5) and women without (Table 6) and without a degree (Table 7).
Overall, we should note that standard errors for the age-productivity profiles
are much higher than in the restricted model. This is due to the fact that our
constructed proportion of workers for each type is less precise due to the small
sample of workers selected from each workplace.
Still focusing on our preferred estimates (from the mixed model and LP
estimation method with hours) and turning first to men without a degree, we
12Also, we find those productivity profiles not to be sensitive to the inclusion of explicit
controls for workplace practices and organisational changes.
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cannot reject, again, the hypothesis that wages are equal to productivity. While
the wages of men aged between 35 and 55 are 13% higher than men aged below
35, their productivity is similarly 15% higher. Productivity of the workers aged
55 and more seems to be slightly higher than their wage (15% versus 10%) but
the size of the standard error on the productivity differentials (about 5%) does
not allow us to conclude that there is a wage-productivity gap.
However, the coefficient estimates for men with a degree tell a completely
different story. We estimate that wages of the workers aged 55 and more are
39% higher than wages of the reference category while their productivity is only
8% higher. This is the opposite of what we observe for workers aged 35 and
less. This pattern of wage-productivity differentials is thus consistent with an
incentive-compatible wages model where employer defer compensation in order
to elicit the optimal effort level from workers (see for example Lazear (1979)). It
is interesting to note that these differentials appear only in the case of workers
with higher level of education where we expect effort levels to be harder to
monitor.
A likely reason why we reach a different conclusion than Hellerstein, Neu-
mark, and Troske (1999) is that their wage-productivity comparisons are based
on age-wage differentials estimated from a payroll regression. In fact, if we
estimate simple payroll regression by OLS (not shown), we get similar differ-
entials to theirs. This underlines the importance of correctly accounting for
unobserved worker and workplace heterogeneity in order to get unbiased age-
wage profiles. Our results are similar than Aubert and Cre´pon (2003) for the
restricted model but since they do not interact age with gender and education,
we cannot compare our results for the complete model where we do observe a
differential.
Tables 6 and 7 present wage-productivity differentials for women, depending
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on whether they possess at least an undergraduate degree or not. While results
for women without a degree are similar to men, in the case of women with a
degree, we cannot reject the hypothesis that wages are equal to productivity.
Unfortunately, this seems to be mostly due to the fact that productivity differ-
entials are estimated with much less precision. We note again the importance
of taking into account unobserved productivity shocks and measuring the labor
input by hours of work: results using OLS show a very large wage-productivity
gap for women aged 35 and less. However, this gap mostly disappears once we
control for such factors.13
4.1 Capital Stock
The estimated coefficient on capital stock (not shown) is close to zero in all
specifications. This is common in production function estimation using firm-
level micro survey data. Aubert and Cre´pon (2003), for instance, report capital
shares of between 0.13–0.14 and Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), report
an even lower coefficient of 0.05.
That being said, there are at least two explanations for our low capital stock
parameter estimates. First, a large proportion of our sample operates in the
service sector, in which physical capital does not play the type of role it would in,
say, the manufacturing sector. Second – and this is also a common problem – our
imputed capital stock measure is likely to be subject to measurement error. To
assess the extent of the potential bias introduced by this problem, we reestimate
the model omitting the capital stock variable entirely. The age-productivity
differentials were virtually identical in the two models. We conclude from this
that our productivity differential estimates are robust to our measure of the
capital stock.
13Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) also estimated a very large gap for women aged
35 and less and made the hypothesis that this was due to weaker labor attachment. Our
results confirm this hypothesis.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the relationship between wages and
productivity across the lifecycle. We use linked employer-employee data to
estimate wage equations controlling for the age of the worker and estimate pro-
duction functions that depend on the age structure of each firm’s workforce,
and compare results from both specifications. Our framework is thus similar
to Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) and Aubert and Cre´pon (2003).
However, we improve the estimation of wage equations by taking into account
both individual and firm unobserved heterogeneity using a mixed model of wage
determination (as suggested by Abowd and Kramarz (1999b)). We also con-
trol for unobserved time-varying productivity shocks in the production function
using a method suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
The data used come from the WES 1999-2003 from Statistics Canada. Since
the survey is linked, there is no need to assign workers to firms using statistical
matching methods like to Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999). Moreover,
the survey is designed to be representative of all firms operating in Canada.
We have information on each workplace’s production process, organizational
practices (and changes in such practices), and human resources policies.
We find evidence that wages of men with at least an undergraduate degree
aged 35 and less are lower than their productivity while the reverse is true for
men aged 55 and more, a pattern coherent with deferred compensation models.
This is a particularly worrying results with respect to the current aging of the
workforce. Moreover, the presence of back loading of compensation for this
group is likely to translate into fewer hiring opportunities for older workers. In
fact, building on the recognition that many workplaces employ older workers
but do not hire older workers, many studies (for example Daniel and Heywood
(2007) and Hutchens (1988)) find such a link between deferred compensation
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and hiring opportunities.
We should note that in all our specifications, age-productivity differentials
are estimated with much less precision than age-earning differentials. This is
probably due to the fact that the different age groups in the production function
are computed using a sample of workers from each firm. One should also note
that we distinguish workers only based on age, gender and education. Another
important distinction is occupation. For example, it might be important to dis-
tinguish workers in managerial positions from workers in production positions.
However, our sample of workers from each firm is not big enough to allow such
fine distinctions14.
Finally, all results depend on whether our method for the imputation of the
capital stock is realistic or not. Having the right capital stock is important be-
cause productivity differentials are computed based on parameters for different
age group and on the coefficient on labor (α) in the production function. A bias
in this coefficient will translate to a bias in our age-productivity differentials.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics - Employees
1999
Mean Std Dev
ln(Wage) 2.778 0.521
Highest completed degree
Less then high school 0.107 0.309
High school 0.175 0.380
Industry training 0.053 0.162
Trade or vocational diploma 0.088 0.283
Some college 0.104 0.305
Completed college 0.181 0.385
Some university 0.077 0.266
Teacher’s college 0.002 0.049
University certificate 0.018 0.132
Bachelor degree 0.130 0.337
University certificate (> bachelor) 0.019 0.135
Master’s degree 0.031 0.174
Degree in medicine, dentistry, etc. 0.008 0.092
Earned doctorate 0.006 0.078
Experience 16.167 10.714
Seniority 8.517 8.206
Black 0.011 0.104
Other races 0.280 0.449
Women 0.521 0.500
Married 0.566 0.496
Immigrant 0.175 0.380
Years since immigration 3.988 10.181
Union 0.279 0.449
Ptime 0.051 0.220
Occupations
Manager 0.151 0.358
Professional 0.162 0.368
Technician 0.390 0.488
Marketing/sales 0.084 0.277
Clerical/administrative 0.140 0.347
Production w/o certificate 0.074 0.262
Number of employees: 23540
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Table 2: Summary statistics - Workplaces
1999
Mean Std Dev.
Value added ($) 1 235 394 2.12E-07
Number of employees 12.825 54.418
Capital stock ($) 46749 71770
Gross payroll ($) 406127 2759789
Union 0.046 0.181
Labor force
Proportion of men 0.400 0.404
Proportion aged between 35 and 55 0.478 0.388
Proportion aged 55 and over 0.211 0.362
Proportion with a degree 0.244 0.375
Number of workplaces: 5499
Table 3: Wage-productivity differentials - Restricted model - 99-03
OLS
Wage Prod. Prod.(Hours)
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.147*** 1.16 0.124** 1.13 0.158*** 1.16
(0.006) (0.051) (0.051)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.092*** 1.10 -0.003 1.00 0.167** 1.17
(0.009) (0.060) (0.071)
Mixed and LP
Wage Prod. Prod.(Hours)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.125*** 1.13 0.131*** 1.15 0.136*** 1.15
(0.003) (0.029) (0.024)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.110*** 1.12 -0.089*** 0.90 0.113** 1.13
(0.004) (0.033) (0.049)
Reference category: [Age < 35]
Statistically significant at: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%
Both equations include controls for industry (14), year (5) and region (7).
Wage equation includes controls for union status, part time, black, other
race, married, immigrant, years since migration, occupations (6) and a
constant. N=99425.
Production function includes controls for proportion of workers in each
of six occupation category and three ethnic origins, the proportion
of employees that are married, of immigrants, and of employees covered
by an union, controls for organisation change and workplace practices.
It also includes a constant, the log number of employees and the log of
the imputed capital stock. N=20593 (OLS), N=20225 (LP).
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Table 4: Differentials - [Men] and [No degree]
OLS
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.175*** 1.19 0.043 1.04 0.011 1.01
(0.010) (0.066) (0.069)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.095*** 1.10 0.135 1.14 0.271*** 1.30
(0.015) (0.105) (0.070)
Mixed and LP
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.122*** 1.13 0.182*** 1.20 0.135*** 1.15
(0.004) (0.042) (0.037)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.098*** 1.10 0.194*** 1.22 0.135** 1.15
(0.006) (0.067) (0.063)
Reference category: [Age < 35] and [Men] and [No degree]
Statistically significant at: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%
Both equations include controls for industry (14), year (5) and region (7).
Wage equation includes controls for union status, part time, black, other
race, married, immigrant, years since migration, occupations (6) and a
constant. N=99425.
Production function includes controls for proportion of workers in each
of six occupation category and three ethnic origins, the proportion
of employees that are married, of immigrants, and of employees covered
by an union, controls for organisation change and workplace practices.
It also includes a constant, the log number of employees and the log of
the imputed capital stock. N=20593 (OLS), N=20225 (LP).
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Table 5: Differentials - [Men] and [Degree]
OLS
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
[Age < 35] 0.207*** 1.23 0.540*** 1.56 0.463*** 1.48
(0.015) (0.124) (0.131)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.394*** 1.48 0.449*** 1.47 0.388*** 1.40
(0.015) (0.099) (0.100)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.397*** 1.49 0.031 1.03 -0.029 0.97
(0.028) (0.199) (0.208)
Mixed and LP
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
[Age < 35] 0.108*** 1.11 0.469*** 1.52 0.391*** 1.43
(0.007) (0.081) (0.068)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.304*** 1.36 0.535*** 1.60 0.452*** 1.50
(0.006) (0.071) (0.056)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.331*** 1.39 0.166 1.05 0.072 1.08
(0.011) (0.146) (0.151)
Reference category: [Age < 35] and [Men] and [No degree]
Statistically significant at: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%
Both equations include controls for industry (14), year (5) and region (7).
Wage equation includes controls for union status, part time, black, other
race, married, immigrant, years since migration, occupations (6) and a
constant. N=99425.
Production function includes controls for proportion of workers in each
of six occupation category and three ethnic origins, the proportion
of employees that are married, of immigrants, and of employees covered
by an union, controls for organisation change and workplace practices.
It also includes a constant, the log number of employees and the log of
the imputed capital stock. N=20593 (OLS), N=20225 (LP).
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Table 6: Differentials - [Women] and [No degree]
OLS
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
[Age < 35] -0.105*** 0.90 -0.340*** 0.65 -0.373*** 0.61
(0.011) (0.083) (0.088)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] -0.010 0.99 -0.063 0.93 -0.081 0.92
(0.010) (0.065) (0.070)
[55 ≤ Age] -0.052*** 0.95 -0.001 1.00 -0.016 0.98
(0.014) (0.107) (0.110)
Mixed and LP
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
[Age < 35] -0.117*** 0.89 -0.113** 0.87 -0.164*** 0.82
(0.005) (0.050) (0.037)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] -0.027*** 0.97 0.058 1.06 0.010 1.01
(0.005) (0.041) (0.036)
[55 ≤ Age] -0.041*** 0.96 0.082 1.09 0.033 1.04
(0.007) (0.078) (0.070)
Reference category: [Age < 35] and [Men] and [No degree]
Statistically significant at: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%
Both equations include controls for industry (14), year (5) and region (7).
Wage equation includes controls for union status, part time, black, other
race, married, immigrant, years since migration, occupations (6) and a
constant. N=99425.
Production function includes controls for proportion of workers in each
of six occupation category and three ethnic origins, the proportion
of employees that are married, of immigrants, and of employees covered
by an union, controls for organisation change and workplace practices.
It also includes a constant, the log number of employees and the log of
the imputed capital stock. N=20593 (OLS), N=20225 (LP).
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Table 7: Differentials - [Women] and [Degree]
OLS
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
[Age < 35] 0.066*** 1.07 0.008 1.08 -0.084 0.91
(0.015) (0.133) (0.141)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.266*** 1.30 0.199 1.21 0.166 1.17
(0.013) (0.128) (0.116)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.190*** 1.21 0.259 1.27 0.178 1.18
(0.029) (0.177) (0.168)
Mixed and LP
Wage Prod. Prod. (Hours)
Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio Coef. Ratio
[Age < 35] 0.003*** 1.00 0.206*** 1.23 0.161* 1.18
(0.007) (0.073) (0.090)
[35 ≤ Age < 55] 0.162*** 1.18 0.354*** 1.39 0.271*** 1.30
(0.007) (0.073) (0.070)
[55 ≤ Age] 0.139*** 1.15 0.269 1.30 0.218 1.24
(0.014) (0.176) (0.193)
Reference category: [Age < 35] and [Men] and [No degree]
Statistically significant at: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%
Both equations include controls for industry (14), year (5) and region (7).
Wage equation includes controls for union status, part time, black, other
race, married, immigrant, years since migration, occupations (6) and a
constant. N=99425.
Production function includes controls for proportion of workers in each
of six occupation category and three ethnic origins, the proportion
of employees that are married, of immigrants, and of employees covered
by an union, controls for organisation change and workplace practices.
It also includes a constant, the log number of employees and the log of
the imputed capital stock. N=20593 (OLS), N=20225 (LP).
